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Abstract
The present work aims to highlight the relationship between 
board gender diversity and firms’ internationalization 
degree and to investigate whether family ownership exerts 
a moderating role on the relationship above mentioned. 
While a greater presence of women on board, on one hand, 
increases diversity, that, in turn, may stimulate firms’ 
internationalization, on the other hand, it may increase 
firms’ risk aversion, reducing risky investments, such as 
those in internationalization. Besides, since in the Italian 
context families represent the main controlling owner, this 
work investigates its moderating role on the relationship in 
the exam. Family ownership may negatively influence the 
board gender diversity-firms’ internationalization degree 
relationship because of family members’ desire to protect 
their socio-emotional wealth. Basing on a sample of Italian 
listed firms, the empirical findings of this work show that 
women directors ratio negatively affects firms’ export 
intensity and family ownership strengthens this relationship.
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INTRODUCTION
T h e  i n c r e a s i n g  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  f i r m s  i n 
internationalization activities is one of the clearest 
responses to the perpetual  modifying dynamics 
of the global environment (Alegre et al. ,  2012). 
Internationalization does not represent just a way to 
take advantage of opportunities in new countries: It 
may also be considered as a shield to defend the firms’ 
existing activities against global competitors, who, if left 
undisputed, may get stronger themselves and threaten 
the firm (Papadopoulos & Martìn, 2010).
In addition, over the last years the weakening of 
domestic markets has encouraged firms to enter foreign 
markets or increase their foreign sales. Firms that do not 
undertake internationalization strategies risk reducing 
their competitiveness, which, in turn, may compromise 
their performance (George et al., 2005). Therefore, 
internationalization strategy is assuming a crucial role in 
the firms’ survival and competitiveness. 
Dunning’s (1981) eclectic paradigm highlights 
that firms expand into other countries to exploit 
advantages connected to ownership (O), location 
(L), and internalization (I)—the OLI paradigm. The 
Uppsala School (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) illustrates 
a framework to comprehend why firms begin their 
internationalization process in a late phase of their 
development and why such process is carried out slowly 
and incrementally once started. Recently, scholars have 
contended that firms undertake internationalization 
strategies to address the competitive disadvantages 
linked to their own internal resources (Liang et al., 
2014) and/or to overcome disadvantages related to the 
hostile domestic environment that may constitute a 
serious constraint, such as protectionism and pulverized 
economy (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Both perspectives, 
however, underline the importance of the firms’ internal 
resources and competencies, that may represent a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage and affect the 
firms’ internationalization process. In order to implement 
successful internationalization strategies, firms need 
a large amount of heterogeneous resources, such as 
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knowledge, information, technology and managerial 
capability.
In this context, scholars point out that the board of 
directors constitutes an important source of human and 
relational capital which provides the resources needed 
to support the internationalization process and that 
firms react to international complexity employing their 
governing bodies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Indeed, 
the board of directors plays a crucial role in shaping and 
implementing the strategic decisions, such as those on the 
internationalization, advising management and monitoring 
the effects of these decisions (Haunschild, 1993).
In recent years, an emerging strand of literature has 
examined the relationship between the board of directors 
and firms’ degree of internationalization (Barroso et 
al., 2011; Rivas, 2012; Chen et al., 2016). Despite the 
development of the studies on the relationship between 
the board of directors and internationalization, the effect 
of board gender diversity on the firms’ internationalization 
degree, to the best of my knowledge, has not been still 
investigated. 
The aim of the present work is twofold. First, this study 
intends to investigate whether the presence of women 
on boards of directors impacts firms’ export intensity. 
Indeed, board gender diversity is receiving a considerable 
attention from scholars, business community, investors, 
and policymakers. Regulators have called for increasing 
the presence of women directors on boards in order both 
to diminish the gender gap and to take into account the 
suggestions deriving from the corporate governance 
literature highlighting that gender diversity make boards 
more effective (Bianco et al., 2015). However, empirical 
findings show that the effect of the presence of women 
directors on boards is still controversial (Joecks et al., 
2014). 
These arguments make full of sense an investigation on 
the relationship between the presence of female directors 
and firms’ internationalization degree.
Second, this work explores the moderating effect of 
family ownership on the relationship above mentioned. 
Indeed, the context investigated in the present study 
– based on the Italian setting—appears stimulating to 
explore because it is characterized by concentrated 
ownership: specifically, families represent the most diffuse 
form of control in the Italian setting (Consob, 2015). In 
addition, family members are often involved in governing 
body, sitting on the board of directors or appointed as 
CEO (La Porta et al., 1999). The involvement of family 
in corporate governance or in managerial positions allows 
the family to affect family firms’ strategy and, therefore, 
the internationalization process.
This study makes two contributions. Firstly, the 
focus on the impact of women directors on international 
performance offers new insights about the effect of board 
demographic characteristics on board advisory role. In 
fact, while many studies have focused on the effect of 
board gender diversity on financial (Ayadi et al., 2015) 
and accounting performance (Mahadeo et al., 2012), 
scant attention has been devoted to the effect of women 
directors on the achievement of strategic goals, and 
relative literature is still at a nascent stage of development. 
Accordingly, this study might bring new knowledge to the 
board gender diversity studies.
Secondly, it highlights that the effect of board gender 
diversity on the internationalization process needs to be 
investigated in the context of ownership identity types. 
Considering the moderating effect of family ownership 
in this study—based on a sample of Italian listed firms—
is crucial because Italian stock market is characterized 
by high stock concentration across the firms (La Porta et 
al., 1999), and families constitute the main controlling 
stockholders.
The structure of the present work is as follows:
The next section contains a literature review that enables 
to develop a set of hypotheses. The empirical analysis 
(including the description of the sample and the definition 
of variables) is contained in the second section, followed 
by the illustration of the empirical results. The fourth 
section presents the discussion and concluding comments.
1 .  T H E O R E T I C A L  R E V I E W  A N D 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Literature attributes two main tasks to the board of 
directors: monitoring and providing resources (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Agency scholars assign the controlling 
function on the activities of management to the board of 
directors because shareholders believe that managers act 
in their own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From a 
different perspective, resource dependence theory asserts 
that the firm’s main objective is to control the resources 
needed to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). From this 
perspective, the board supports the decision-making 
process of the firm, providing it with competencies, 
expertise, and advice. This approach implies that the board 
cooperates with management – rather than controlling it – 
to shape and implement the internationalization strategy. 
Using the resource dependence perspective, women 
directors may positively or negatively affect the 
internationalization process.
Indeed, many studies have highlighted that, compared 
to their male counterparts, women are able to offer a 
fresh view on complex topics (Francoeur et al., 2008) 
and provide original points, experience, distinct values, 
knowledge and expertise (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013), 
and therefore widen the set of information and views 
(Terjesen et al., 2016). As a consequence, the presence of 
women directors increases board diversity, which, in turn, 
stimulates internationalization. Actually, firms operating 
in foreign markets have to face contexts characterized by 
diversity. Consequently, a more heterogeneous board could 
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help to better comprehend the complexities of international 
markets and communicate to key stakeholders that the 
firm is committing to analyze new markets through the 
use of a larger pool of information and views (Rivas, 
2012). Scholars emphasize that institutional investors are 
increasingly appreciating diversity in boardrooms and 
are very interested in financing the internationalization 
of companies with women on their boards of directors, 
because their presence guarantees good governance and 
favors the comprehension of different cultures (Brown et 
al., 2002). 
The greater presence of women on board, increasing 
board diversity, stimulates internationalization processes.
According to the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:
H1a: The Ratio of Women Directors Is Positively 
Associated With Export Intensity
Internationalization process implies both benefits— 
such as the achievement of economies of scale and scope, 
the expansion of innovative capabilities—and costs— 
such as additional financial and managerial resources (Hitt 
et al., 2006). In addition, it is a risky process because of 
the cultural, political and economic differences between 
domestic and foreign markets, and the lack of information 
on foreign environment (Sciascia et al., 2012). The risks 
are crucial when it comes to the effects of the presence of 
women on the board of directors. Indeed, the literature on 
gender emphasizes the risk-aversion of females compared 
to their male counterparts’ (Eckel & Grossman, 2008). 
There are two main reasons behind this difference in risk-
aversion. 
The first reason lies in women’s affective reactions 
to risky situations (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). As a matter 
of fact, women’s perception of bad outcomes is more 
negative than men’s, and consequently they show a 
greater reluctance to risk. Besides, in similar situations, 
women tend to experience fear while men are inclined to 
experience anger (Grossman & Wood, 1993). Differently 
from fear, anger leads individuals to perceive a given 
lottery as less risky (Lerner et al., 2003).
The second reason lies in overconfidence: Men are 
generally more overconfident than women (Levi et al., 
2014) both because women may consider their forecasts 
about future events as less punctual (Barber & Odean, 
2001) and because they foresee future scenarios in a less 
positive way (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). Besides, women 
tend to judge their financial skills as being more limited 
than male counterparts’ (Robichaud et al., 2007). Owing 
to their tendency to be less overconfident than men, 
women are also less prone to undertake risky actions. 
Empir ical  f indings show that  women’s  r isk-
aversion affects their  f inancing and investment 
decisions (Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 2007): Compared 
to men, women who manage mutual funds appear to 
make investment choices that reflect a lower level of 
unsystematic risk and prefer more stable returns (Niessen 
& Ruenzi, 2006). Firms managed by female CEOs take 
lower risks in financing and investment decisions than 
those run by male CEOs and the firm risk level tends to 
increase with the passage from a female CEO to a male 
one (Faccio et al., 2016). Literature has documented that 
there is a negative relationship between the presence 
of women directors and both the likelihood to make an 
acquisition and the bid premium’s size (Levi et al., 2014): 
These results are explained as a consequence of the lower 
overconfidence of female directors which leads them 
to reduce the overvaluation risk of merger gains. More 
generally, firm risk level is lower in firms run by female 
CEOs (Khan & Vieito, 2013). The more ambiguous and 
uncertain the investment, the greater the risk-aversion of 
women (Schubert et al., 2000). 
Consequently, the risk-aversion of women directors 
may lead them to influence the decision-making process 
in order to avoid risky investment, such as those in 
internationalization.
According to the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:
H1b: The Ratio of Women Directors Is Negatively 
Associated With Export Intensity
Controlling families are usually very much involved 
in corporate governance, as revealed by the regular 
appointment of family members to the board of directors 
or even to CEO positions (La Porta et al., 1999). The 
presence of family members in the firms’ governing body 
allows the family to influence the firms’ decision-making 
process. By their ownership, family members can exercise 
control rights to affect strategic decisions. Scholars 
underline the risk-aversion of the family firm owners, 
which influences several firms’ strategic decisions, 
including internationalization (Liang et al., 2014).
Family risk-aversion may derive from the family 
members’ desire to protect their socio-emotional wealth 
(SEW, henceforth): Indeed, family members take care to 
preserve the nonfinancial aspects of their business, that is 
the “socio-emotional endowment” associated with their 
dominant position in the firm, and evaluate the effect of 
strategic choices on that endowment (Gómez-Mejia et 
al., 2011). In order to expand into other countries, firms 
may need additional financial funds (Lessard, 1985) 
and external management experience because of the 
firm’s lack of knowledge in foreign markets (Pukall & 
Calabrò, 2013). However, if, on one side, both external 
financial funders and non family managers would provide 
additional resources, on the other side they would 
influence the decision-making process, thus reducing the 
influence and the control of the family over the business. 
Said loss of influence and control, which represent a 
fundamental dimension of SEW, would generate a loss in 
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terms of affective endowment. Consequently, the family 
members could be reluctant to seek external sources of 
finance or to hire non-family managers, to avoid the 
dilution of their control over the decision-making process, 
which, as said above, decreases their socio-emotional 
wealth (Berrone et al., 2012).
Based on the above, this work formulates the following 
hypothesis:
H2: Family Ownership Negatively Moderates the 
Relationship Between the Ratio of Women Directors and 
the Export Intensity
2. METHOD
2.1 Sample
The empirical context of this paper is provided by firms 
listed on the Italian Stock Exchange during the period 
2010-2013. In order to be included in the study sample, 
firms must preliminarily satisfy the following criteria: 
a) the firm was in non financial sectors; b) it had a 
fiscal year-end of December 31; and c) the firm was 
continuously listed on the Italian Stock Exchange during 
the period 2010-2013. In addition, firms were excluded 
if information on export were not available. Accordingly, 
the final sample consisted of 114 firms and generated 
456 observations (114 firms × 4 years). The financial 
reporting data (including foreign sales, total sales, total 
debt, total asset, and total asset turnover) are extracted 
from Datastream Thomson Reuters. Data on boards (total 
number of directors and number of women directors) 
and on family shareholding are drawn by Consob 
Database.
Using a data set of firms listed on Italian Stock 
Exchange relative to the period 2010-2013, this work 
examines the relationship among women directors, 
export intensity, and family ownership. Italian listed 
companies constitute the ideal context for this study. 
Firstly, the number of women directors in Italian 
corporate boards has been gradually increasing because 
the promulgation of Law 120/2011, which established 
that the directors of the less represented gender must 
represent one-third (one-fifth for the first term) of the 
board seats (Bianco et al., 2015). Secondly, the Italian 
stock market is characterized by high stock concentration 
across the firms (La Porta et al., 1999), and families 
represent the main controlling shareholders. Specifically, 
family ownership represents the most diffused form of 
control (Faccio & Lang, 2002): Families often use cross 
ownership, pyramids and dual class of shares to assure 
themselves control on their firms. 
2.2 Definitions of Variables
The dependent variable of internationalization is 
represented by export intensity and is calculated as the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Said ratio is the most 
popular definition in the internationalization research 
(Chen, 2011) and reflects the relevance of international 
operations compared to total operations and, therefore, the 
measure of the firm’s dependence on international markets 
(Barroso et al., 2011). 
Women directors ratio, the independent variable, 
is measured as the number of female directors divided 
by the number of directors (Liao et al., 2015). The 
percentage of female directors is a proxy of board gender 
diversity.
Family ownership serves as the moderator and is 
represented by the number of shares held by a family 
divided by total shares outstanding (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006).
A series of control variables have been included 
to control the women directors’ effects on the export 
intensity. Since scholars point out that internationalization 
involves a financial support (Tihanyi et al., 2013), 
leverage is controlled and obtained from total debt 
divided by total asset. Total asset turnover, calculated 
as the ratio between revenues and total asset, measures 
the effectiveness of the firm’s use of its total (tangible 
and intangible) assets (Reilly & Brown, 2011). Given 
the arguments advanced in literature that age of the firm 
influences its capability to gather information about 
international activities and to make up the architecture 
supporting the internationalization process (Chen, 2011), 
firm age is controlled and measured by the number of 
years a firm has lived (Zahra, 2003).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Export intensity (%) 54.33 31.53
2. Women directors ratio (%) 10.13 9.86  -0.043
3. Age 56.44 37.65 0.076 0.008
4. Leverage (%) 30.81 18.49  -0.179**  -0.147**  0.064
5. Total asset turnover (%) 0.36 0.75  -0.148**  -0.037 -0.132**  -0.067
6. Family ownership (%) 33.51 31.76  0.041  0.219**  -0.016  -0.103*   0.062
Note. N=456; *, ** for statistically significant levels at 0.05 and 0.01.
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Table 2
Regression Results of the Export Intensity
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age  0.07  0.07  0.07
Leverage -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.21***
Total asset turnover -0.15*** -0.16***  -0.16***
Women directors ratio -0.08*  0.00
Family ownership  0.12*
Interaction of women directors ratio x family ownership   -0.16*
R  0.25  0.27  0.29
R2  0.06  0.07  0.08
R2 change  0.01  0.01
Note. * p<0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Pearson 
correlations. On average, export intensity is 54.33% and 
boards are composed of 10.13% of women directors. 
The average shareholding held by families is 33.51%. 
The matrix also displays some significant correlations. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) are used in order to test for 
multicollinearity. All values are lower than 2 (maximum 
VIF value = 1.15) and indicate that multicollinearity 
does not represent a concern in our analysis and does not 
compromise it (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 2 contains the results of regression analysis. 
Model 1 reports a statistically significant association 
between export intensity and the following control 
variables: leverage (b = -0.19; p < 0.01) and total asset 
turnover (b = -0.15; p < 0.01). Model 2 represents the 
regression model to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, and, 
therefore, to test whether greater women directors ratio 
affects export intensity, respectively, in positive or 
negative way. The regression result demonstrates that 
women directors ratio is negative and significant (b = 
-0.08; p < 0.10). Therefore, the result supports Hypothesis 
1b, which proposes that a greater percentage of women on 
board negatively influences export intensity. 
Hypothesis 2 indicates that the greater the family 
ownership, the more negative is the relationship between 
women directors ratio and export intensity. The result of 
Model 3 shows that the interaction of women directors 
ratio with family ownership is negative and significant (b 
= - 0.16; p < 0.10). Hence, family ownership negatively 
moderates the relationship between women directors ratio 
and export intensity, providing support for Hypothesis 2. 
In other words, the negative women directors ratio-export 
intensity relationship becomes stronger for high level of 
family ownership. 
CONCLUSION
The first result of empirical analysis is that a greater 
presence of women on boards negatively affects export 
intensity. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact 
that a greater presence of female directors, and therefore 
of directors with greater aversion to risk, may make the 
board more reluctant to undertake risky investment, and 
may influence the decision-making process, discouraging 
export intensity. Indeed, when women directors face issues 
relative to the internationalization process, their risk-
aversion may lead them to emphasize the riskiness linked 
to the internationalization strategy (Croson & Gneezy, 
2009), due to environmental differences between domestic 
and foreign markets and to lack of information on foreign 
markets (Sciascia et al., 2012), while at the same time 
they understate the relevance of the relative benefits, such 
as cost savings, the use of cheaper resources, and the 
market risk diversification (Dunning, 1981). 
This study also finds that family ownership negatively 
moderates the relationship between women directors 
ratio and export intensity. Actually, family members are 
appointed to the boards of the firms they control or they 
appoint non-family directors linked to controlling family. 
The finding that the negative relationship between women 
directors ratio and export intensity becomes stronger 
by family ownership suggests that family members use 
their control rights to influence the decision-making 
process and, specifically, to discourage investments in 
internationalization. Therefore, the negative influence of 
women directors on export intensity is strengthened in 
family firms because of the presence on board of family 
members—or directors linked to the controlling family—
that are reluctant to undertake risky investments, because 
of the lack of diversification of the family wealth and the 
desire to protect their socio-emotional wealth (Gómez-
Mejia et al., 2011).
This work is not free from limitations. First, this study 
explores the effect of women directors on export intensity, 
which is only one of several measures representing a 
firm’s internationalization degree. In order to make a 
deeper investigation on internationalization, some scholars 
propose the use of other measures, such as the ratio of 
foreign assets to total assets and the number of foreign 
subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries. 
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Future works on the effects of board gender diversity 
on firms’ internationalization degree could consider 
multiple measures of internationalization as a dependent 
variable.
Second, the work is based on a quite short time period. 
Further analysis might focuses on a longer time span. 
Besides, it focus on the period 2010-2013. It would be 
interesting to analyse the relationship after the full effects 
of the promulgation of Law 120/2011, which established 
that the directors of the less represented gender must 
represent one-third (one-fifth for the first term) of the 
board seats.
Lastly, this study focus on the relationship between 
board gender diversity and firms’ internationalization 
within one national context. Future studies should contain 
cross-country analyses.
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